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1  | INTRODUCTION
Improvements in medication safety in paediatric oncology can be 
achieved by using electronic medication management (EMM) sys-
tems (also known as computerized provider order entry—CPOE) 
with clinical decision support (CDS; Aita et al., 2013; Bannan & Tully, 
2016; Brenner et al., 2016; Chen & Lehmann, 2011; Elsaid, Garguilo, 
& Collins, 2015; Maaskant et al., 2015; Rinke et al., 2014; van Rosse 
et al., 2009; Small, Barrett, & Price, 2008). This technology has the 
potential to improve safety by facilitating the scheduling of chemo-
therapy cycles and associated monitoring tests, calculating cumu-
lative doses of drugs and supporting medication workflows (Allen 
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Abstract
Objective: To explore medication safety issues related to use of an electronic medi-
cation management system (EMM) in paediatric oncology practice, through the anal-
ysis of patient safety incident reports.
Methods: We	analysed	827	voluntarily	reported	incidents	relating	to	oncology	pa-
tients that occurred over an 18-month period immediately following implementation 
of	an	EMM	in	a	paediatric	hospital	in	Australia.	We	identified	medication‐related	and	
EMM-related incidents and carried out a content analysis to identify patterns.
Results: We	found	~79%	(n = 651) of incidents were medication-related and, of these, 
~45%	 (n = 294) were EMM-related. Medication-related incidents included issues 
with: prescribing; dispensing; administration; patient transfers; missing chemother-
apy protocols and information on current stage of patient treatment; coordination 
of chemotherapy administration; handling or storing medications; children or fami-
lies handling medications. EMM-related incidents were classified into four groups: 
technical issues, issues with the user experience, unanticipated problems in EMM 
workflow, and missing safety features.
Conclusions: Incidents reflected difficulties with managing therapies rich in interde-
pendencies. EMM, and especially its ‘automaticity’, contributed to these incidents. As 
EMM impacts on safety in such high-risk settings, it is essential that users are aware 
of and attend to EMM automatic behaviours and are equipped to troubleshoot them.
K E Y WO RD S
computerized provider order entry system, evaluation research, hospital oncology services, 
medication errors, paediatrics, patient safety
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et al., 2018; Elsaid et al., 2013; Gandhi, Tyono, Pasetka, & Trudeau, 
2014; Hoffman, Baker, Howard, Laver, & Shenep, 2011). However, 
technology can also introduce new opportunities for error, and lead 
to unwanted effects on work practices (Elsaid et al., 2015). For ex-
ample, errors in the configuration of prescribing templates may be 
‘automatically incorporated into otherwise error-free prescriptions’ 
(Aita et al., 2013). Comprehensive EMM systems for chemotherapy 
protocols are challenging to implement, both in adult and paediatric 
settings	(Martin,	Kaemingk,	Frieze,	Hendrie,	&	Payne,	2015;	Whalen	
et al., 2018). They require time-dependent, patient-specific dosing 
functions based on factors such as age, weight and surface area 
(highly variable over a child's course of treatment), organ function, as 
well as functionalities for scheduling and timing of interdependent 
medications and supportive care. The systems must address critical 
workflow functionalities, such as dual/multiple authorisations and 
checks of orders by an oncologist and verified by a pharmacist and 
two nurses (Martin et al., 2015). After implementation, EMM sys-
tems need maintenance and updating to address changes in work 
practices and in chemotherapy protocols (Chen & Lehmann, 2011).
We	aimed	to	explore	medication	safety	issues	related	to	use	of	
EMM in paediatric oncology practice, through the analysis of patient 
safety incident reports.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Setting and EMM
Data derived from voluntary reports of patient safety incidents were 
gathered from a children's cancer centre within a 350-bed tertiary 
paediatric	 hospital	 in	 Sydney,	New	South	Wales	 (NSW),	Australia.	
The centre introduced an EMM system in oncology covering in-
patient/outpatient services and home-based care. The EMM was 
integrated in the hospital electronic medical record system (EMR; 
Cerner Corporation, https ://www.cerner.com/) so that patients’ 
medications, tests orders and results and medical notes are entered 
and accessed from a single system.
The EMM allows prescribing, recording of drug dispensing, doc-
umentation of drug administration and medication reconciliation 
and monitoring, with all drugs and fluids. However, at the time of 
study, prescription and administration of blood products and par-
enteral nutrition were still paper-based and outpatient prescriptions 
required a signature on printed copies. The CDS includes links to 
guidelines, order sets, order sentences, safety alerts (e.g. drug–drug 
interactions) and dosage calculators. To order chemotherapy with 
EMM, prescribers are required to select a pre-populated plan, or if a 
plan is unavailable (for patients on unique or individual chemother-
apy protocols), to create and complete orders using a prebuilt order 
template. The EMM system provides access to multiple medication 
screens, including multiple screens for prescribing, a summary view 
of medications prescribed, as well as a MAR (medication administra-
tion record) screen for administration. The system allows for direct 
links to the chemotherapy protocol attached as a PDF to the patient 
record. There is ‘automation’ across screens, so that medications 
prescribed (or ceased) ‘drop’ automatically into the MAR (or are re-
moved from the chart if ceased). Upon prescribers entering orders 
into the system, the EMM automatically schedules items for ad-
ministration over set frequencies, days and times. The system pro-
vides check points (a ‘ready for chemo’ tick box) for oncologists to 
approve nurses’ proceeding with administration of chemotherapy. 
Medications entered in chemotherapy plans must be ‘activated’ first 
for nurses to be able to administer. Prescribing chemotherapy is re-
stricted to senior medical officers and fellows.
2.2 | The dataset
The	NSW	Health	 Incident	 Information	Management	System	(NSW	
Health, 2014) collects staff reported incidents to enable analysis of 
contributory factors and to develop interventions. In broad terms, 
incidents are defined as ‘any unplanned event resulting in, or with 
the	potential	for,	injury,	damage	or	other	loss’	(NSW	Health,	2014).
A retrospective review was undertaken of all incidents reported 
by staff related to oncology patients in the hospital in the 18 months 
immediately following EMM implementation (15 August 2016–15 
February 2018). In total, 827 oncology-related incidents were re-
ported, related to any aspect of patient care, including medications, 
with or without the use of the EMM system.
The study received ethics approval by the hospital's human re-
search ethics committee. The data were de-identified prior to review 
and analysis.
2.3 | Methods for analysis
As background for the analysis, we compiled descriptive statistics 
of the age of the patient involved in the incident and severity of in-
cidents, as classified by the hospital. The incidents were assigned a 
Severity	Assessment	Code	(SAC)	score	(NSW	Health,	2014)	by	the	
hospital. This score, 1 through 4, indicates the severity of any poten-
tial or actual consequence and the likelihood of the incident reoccur-
ring (with higher scores indicating less severity). The incidents were 
assigned either or both an ‘Initial SAC’ (by the reporting person) and 
‘Actual SAC’ score (reviewed by manager).
For all incidents in the dataset, we reviewed the Incident descrip‐
tion and Contributing factors fields (i.e. free text describing the events). 
We	coded	each	incident	on	the	basis	of	two	coding	schemes—first	to	
identify incidents ‘related, or not, to medication’ (and at which stage of 
the medication process the incident occurred) and second to identify 
medication-related incidents ‘related, or not, to EMM’ (and which type 
of issue was reported). The two coding schemes, based on established 
classification systems (Krzyzaniak & Bajorek, 2016; NCC MERP, 2018; 
Sittig, Classen, & Singh, 2014), were iteratively tested on samples of 
incident reports and progressively refined during the analysis.
2.3.1 | Classification of medication‐related incidents
Medication-related incidents were those involving at least one medi-
cation, regardless of medication type. Incidents involving TPN (Total 
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Parenteral Nutrition), oxygen administration and blood transfusions 
were also included as these form part of oncology supportive care 
treatment and follow similar processes of order, supply and admin-
istration. Table 1 describes the coding scheme used to classify inci-
dents on the basis of the medication phase. Multiple categories were 
allowed for each report.
2.3.2 | Classification of EMM‐related incidents
Medication-related incidents were then coded as ‘with EMM’ when 
it was clear, or it could be reasonably inferred from the description 
of the incident, that the EMM was used at the time the incident oc-
curred. Table 2 outlines the coding scheme used to classify the type 
of EMM-related issue reported.
Three researchers, with expertise in medication safety and 
health informatics, coded the incident reports. They initially coded 
and discussed three samples (84, 51 and 48 reports) to assess consis-
tency in coding and suitability of the coding schemes. Following the 
three	 attempts	 to	 improve	 consistency	 (eventually	 reaching	 ~79%	
agreement	 for	HIT,	~50%	 for	medication	 stage),	 the	 remaining	 re-
ports were independently coded by two researchers. All inconsis-
tencies in coding were discussed to reach a final consensus.
In order to gain a more refined understanding of the nature and 
patterns of incidents, we then carried out a qualitative content analy-
sis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) of the EMM-related, medication-related 
incidents. This analysis was informed by a human factors’ perspec-
tive	(Carayon,	Wooldridge,	Hose,	Salwei,	&	Benneyan,	2018).	This	is	
a systemic analytical lens that considers people and technology as 
interacting in a socio-technical whole. Errors, or incidents, are un-
derstood as resulting from the dynamic interaction of the elements 
of the sociotechnical system, not from one element alone (i.e. the 
human or the EMM system).
In reporting the results, we present the quantitative distribu-
tion of the incidents as background to the qualitative findings, but 
note that it is not appropriate to use counts of voluntary incident 
reports as a measure of incident numbers that have occurred 
(Schwappach	&	Gehring,	2015;	Westbrook	et	al.,	2015).	While	we	
report on all types of medication incidents reported, we focus on 
TA B L E  1   Coding scheme for classification of medication-related incidents
Medication phase Description (inclusion/exclusion criteria)
Prescribing ‘All [incidents] that occur during the decision process and in prescribing/ordering a medication for a patient’ (Krzyzaniak & 
Bajorek, 2016)
Order 
communication
All incidents that occur at the stage of communicating the prescription for dispensing to pharmacy
Includes also incidents related to the ‘ready for chemo tick’ (EMM tick box used for communicating doctors’ okay to proceed 
with administration)
Dispensing All incidents about ‘product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature, compounding, dispensing, distribution’ (NCC MERP, 
2018)
‘All [incidents] that occur during the interpretation of medication prescriptions by the pharmacy staff and the subsequent 
selection, preparation, labelling and distribution of medication’ (Krzyzaniak & Bajorek, 2016)
Administration ‘All [incidents] that occur whilst a medication is being administered to a patient’ (Krzyzaniak & Bajorek, 2016)
Includes also:
• incidents related to medication compounding and preparation by nurses on the ward
• incidents related to storing and safe keeping of medication on the ward
• incidents related to leaking/breaking of IV bags if during the administration to a patient (otherwise coded as other)
Education All incidents that relate to informing the patient or family about the medication
Monitoring ‘All [incidents] associated with the monitoring of clinical and/or laboratory data that assess the patient's response to the 
administered drug therapy i.e. through therapeutic drug-monitoring practices’ (Krzyzaniak & Bajorek, 2016)
Includes also incidents about monitoring and recording of fluids
Use All incidents that relate to a patient's or families’ use of the medication—for example, giving/taking medications, making 
decisions about medications
Other All other incidents where a medication was involved but incident did not occur during one of the above-listed stages. 
Includes also:
• Incidents related to chemotherapy protocols (missing, wrong, not up to date)
• Incidents related to the ‘activation’ of chemotherapy in the EMM system
• Control of/accounting for controlled drugs
• Incidents related to IV lines and leaking of bags that did not occur during administration
• Incidents that occur at the phase of pharmacy verification of the prescription
• Incidents that occur at the time of patient discharge or transfer
Unclear Incidents where there is not enough information to determine at what stage the incident occurred
Not applicable When	there	is	no	medication	involved	in	the	incident
Note: Medication phases derived from NCC MERP definition of medication errors (NCC MERP, 2018), with additional definitions (Krzyzaniak & 
Bajorek, 2016).
Abbreviations: chemo, chemotherapy; EMM, electronic medication management system; IV, intravenous.
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those where EMM had a role. In the results, we refer to specific 
incidents by providing the incident identification number (e.g. 
id123).
3  | RESULTS
The age of the children, whose care the incidents were about, ranged 
from neonates and babies to young and older children and teenagers 
(up to 19 years of age). In terms of severity, not all 827 incidents were 
assigned SAC scores; among those where Initial SAC and/or Actual 
SAC scores were given, incidents had respective averages 3.3 (n = 433) 
and 3.4 (n = 628; using the SAC matrix, severity is rated from 1 to 4, 
with higher scores indicating less severity).
Of	 the	 827	 incidents,	 a	 total	 of	 651	 (~79%)	were	 classified	 as	
medication-related (Figure 1). The phase where the incident origi-
nated in the medication ordering/administration process could not 
be determined with accuracy in 41 of these incidents. Of the remain-
ing 610 incidents, 63 were classified under more than one phase. 
Most incidents (n	=	228,	~35%)	occurred	during	prescribing	and	165	
(~25%)	during	administration.	A	large	number	of	incidents	(n = 179, 
~27%)	were	coded	as	‘Other’	(Table	3).
Of	the	651	medication‐related	incidents,	294	(~45%)	were	classi-
fied as EMM-related (Table 4). For approximately half of these (136, 
~46%),	we	determined	that	the	use	of	EMM	was	not	a	factor	 in	the	
incidents reported (coded as HIT 0). The distribution of the remaining 
158 EMM-related incidents across medication phases is detailed in 
Table 5.
ID
Type of health information technology (HIT) re‐
lated safety concern Examples
HIT 1 Instances in which HIT fails during use or is other-
wise not working as designed
Broken hardware or software 
‘bugs’
HIT 2 Instances in which users describe negative experiences 
with HIT such as stress, frustration, or confusion 
(revised definition, modified from original (Sittig et 
al., 2014; ¥)
Users reporting that the system 
is too difficult to use, or too 
slow (example added, not 
in the original (Sittig et al., 
2014; ¥)
HIT 3 Instances in which HIT is well designed and working 
correctly, but was not configured, implemented or 
used in a way anticipated or planned for by system 
designers and developers.
This includes all incidents of EMM use that would be 
useful to show designers to inform possible improve‐
ments to the EMM system—for example, when the 
drugs ‘fell off’ the chart
Duplicate order alerts that 
fire on alternative ‘as 
needed’ pain medications
HIT 4 Instances in which HIT is working as designed and 
was configured and used correctly, but interacts 
with external systems (e.g. via hardware or soft-
ware interfaces) so that data are lost or incorrectly 
transmitted or displayed
Medication order for ex-
tended-release morphine 
inadvertently changed to 
immediate-release morphine 
by error in interface transla-
tion table
HIT 5 Instances in which [it is explicitly reported that] 
specific safety features or functions were not 
implemented or not available (i.e. HIT could have 
prevented a safety concern)
Hospitalised patient inadvert-
ently receives 5 g of aceta-
minophen in 24 hr because 
maximum daily dose alerting 
was not available
HIT 0 None of the above (not in original; Sittig et al., 2014)  
Note: Scheme adapted from Sittig et al. (2014) classification of incidents with health information 
technology	(HIT).	Italics	indicate	modifications	to	the	original	classification.	We	modified	category	
HIT2, originally intended to cover HIT usability issues, to make more explicit dimensions related 
to	the	user	experience	of	EMM	(Usability.gov,	2018).	We	modified	category	HIT3	inclusion	criteria	
as it was not possible to determine that anticipated or planned for by designers or developers. 
Instead, we used HIT3 to classify incidents reporting use of EMM that we assessed would be 
worthwhile for designers to investigate, in order to improve the design of (or the training on) 
EMM.	We	modified	HIT5,	limiting	its	use	to	incident	reports	providing	explicit	reference	to	missing	
features	or	functionalities.	We	added	a	HIT0	‘other’	type	to	code	any	EMM‐related	incidents	not	
otherwise captured by the HIT1-5 categories.
(¥) Original HIT definition: ‘HIT 2: Instances in which HIT is working as designed, but the design 
does not meet the user's needs or expectations. Examples: Usability issues’ (Sittig et al., 2014).
TA B L E  2   Coding scheme for 
classification of electronic medication 
management system (EMM)-related 
incidents
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3.1 | All medication‐related incidents (related or 
unrelated to EMM)
3.1.1 | Prescribing, dispensing and administration
Prescribing incidents included the following: incorrect drug (id88), 
dose for a patient weight (id78) or days/frequency (id315); not 
changing a default dose in an ‘order sentence’ (id70); or prescribing 
for the incorrect patient (id314). At the time of administration, inci-
dents included administration of the incorrect dose of a pain medi-
cation (id223), medication overdose (id480) or signing for a dose as 
given when it was not (id424). At the time of dispensing, incidents 
included the wrong formulation of a drug dispensed (morphine 5 mg 
instead of morphine 5 mg slow release; id206).
3.1.2 | Patient transfers
Incidents were also noted to occur at the time of handovers or trans-
fer between hospital areas, including from ED (id471), operating 
theatre (id54) or ICU (id612) to the oncology wards, as well as trans-
fers between hospitals (id616). Incidents revealed transfers to be 
problematic because of the absence of a suitable interface between 
the hospital and the separate medication systems in these clinical 
areas (e.g. id476).
3.1.3 | Information on chemotherapy protocols
We	identified	several	incidents	reporting	the	lack	(or	currency)	of	
the protocol in the patient record (e.g. id62, id771), lack of infor-
mation about the current stage of therapy (cycle, dose) (e.g. id72, 
id122) and difficulty in identifying ‘where patients are up to’ in 
their treatment (id219). This reflected in part the absence of an 
electronic road map (a ‘summary’ of the chemotherapy protocol; 
Allen et al., 2018) to guide scheduling of therapy, admissions and 
investigations.
3.1.4 | Chemotherapy coordination
Incidents were also related to failure to complete a check point (‘ready 
for chemo tick’), allowing staff to proceed with therapy despite the pa-
tient being ‘ready’ to receive chemotherapy (e.g. id302, id641), or cli-
nicians erroneously progressing with the activation or administration 
of the medicine without the confirmation that the patient was ‘ready’ 
(e.g. id364, id114). In one incident (id302) a child remained under gen-
eral anaesthetic for longer than required while waiting for a missing 
check point to be rectified.
F I G U R E  1   Distribution of the 
incidents in the dataset—related and 
non-related to medication, related and 
non-related to the electronic medication 
management (EMM) system
Paent safety incident reports (n = 827)
Medicaon related (n = 651)
EMM related (n = 294)
EMM not a factor (n = 136)
TA B L E  3   Medication-related incidents
Medication phase
Medication‐related incidents
No. of incidents % (¥)
Prescribing 228 35
Other 179 27
Administration 165 25
Dispensing 31 5
Monitoring 34 5
Order communication 25 4
Use 8 1
Education 3 0
Unclear/phase could not be 
identified
41 6
Note: (¥) More than one category possible for each incident, total 
>100%.
TA B L E  4   Medication and electronic medication management 
system (EMM)-related incidents
Category No. of incidents % of total
HIT 1 37 13
HIT 2 5 2
HIT 3 113 38
HIT 4 0 0
HIT 5 3 1
HIT 0 136 46
Total 294 100
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3.1.5 | ‘Handling’ or storing the medication
Errors in the preparation of medication products, pumps, syringes 
or lines were frequently reported, including shattered ampoules 
(id664, id148), leaking bags (id129), occluded (id238) or accidentally 
disconnected (id316) central venous access lines, storing a ‘do not 
refrigerate’ medication in the fridge (id529) or a ‘keep refrigerated’ 
drug out of the fridge (id744).
3.1.6 | Patients’ ‘use’ of the medication
We	coded	a	small	number	of	incidents	under	the	category	‘patient	
use’. Three of these involved children disconnecting lines, and two 
incidents related to family management of a child's medication 
(id198, id755), one of these at home (id198).
3.2 | Medication‐related incidents determined to be 
EMM‐related
3.2.1 | Technical issues with EMM (HIT 1)
Most of the incidents describing technical issues with EMM were 
related to the underlying automation across medication screens, 
scheduling or charting of medications. For example, ordered medi-
cations not automatically migrating from the prescribing screen to 
the administration chart (id263), ceased medications remaining on 
activation screens (id155), EMM issues with scheduling midnight 
doses (id520) or the system not updating the display of the status of 
a medication after administration (id300). Other technical problems 
related to data visualisation/design (such as visibility of complete 
order sentences—id116), and saving/updating/locking records, sys-
tem response, or availability/accessibility of the system (e.g. EMM 
‘was down’ – id334).
… I think charting the time at 2400 or 0000hrs makes 
the second lot of boluses drop off the MAR for some 
reason 
(id520)
3.2.2 | User experience with EMM (HIT 2)
Incidents described clinicians’ experiences of confusion or frustra-
tion associated with how data were entered or displayed in EMM. 
For example, a chemotherapy cycle plan not broken down into weeks 
(id64), or the need to ‘scroll through’ a plan to determine where the 
patient is up to in terms of treatment (id204). It appears that clini-
cians at times managed to overcome impediments (e.g. in resched-
uling and then activating doses) without understanding where the 
problem was (e.g. id108).
… Nursing staff had difficulty activating the MTX 
[methotrexate] order, error message kept stating 
that MTX blood forms needed to be rescheduled. 
The Night staff re-scheduled the date of these blood 
forms and still could not activate the order. ? unsure 
of the issue, it was finally resolved and the order was 
activated… 
(id108)
3.2.3 | Unanticipated problems in EMM workflow 
(HIT 3)
Several incidents pertained to the task of scheduling doses and the 
timing of medications. An incident outlined contributing factors to 
such events, including complex patient conditions (i.e. requiring ICU 
admission and extra monitoring), a difficult EMM ‘to instruct’, dis-
tributed work among different doctors and working under pressure:
TA B L E  5   Distribution of medication and electronic medication management system (EMM)-related incidents across medication phases
Medication phase
Medication‐related incidents related to EMM
HIT1 HIT2 HIT3 HIT4 HIT5 HIT0 HIT totals (¥) % (¥)
Prescribing 11 3 77  1 52 144 43
Other 6 3 26   34 69 20
Administration 19  14  1 36 70 21
Dispensing 1  2   5 8 2
Monitoring   3  1 7 11 3
Order communication   6   15 21 6
Use        0
Education        0
Unclear/phase could not be 
identified
2  3   9 14 4
        100
Note: (¥) More than one category possible for each incident, totals may differ from Table 4.
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Difficulty in juggling template plan days vs patient's 
clinical condition and moving certain drugs accordingly. 
Multiple/overlapping plans and different prescribers. 
Rapidly reading dosing tables as under pressure to 
order plan while managing clinical loa[d]’ [truncated] 
(id289)
Incidents resulted when prescribers entered medication orders in 
the EMM in different ways, some of which had flow-on effects to other 
users (doctors, or nurses) who could not progress, complete, document 
or sign off with their tasks in the system (e.g. id115, id323 and id200) 
possibly leading to delays and frustration. Modes of prescribing also 
had effects on documentation of chemotherapy, which would not be 
complete or accurate (id86, id119 and id276), and on the linked deci-
sion support functions (i.e. calculations of the cumulative doses; id86).
When	 a	 patient	was	 transferred	 to	 or	 from	 another	ward	 not	
using the same EMM system (e.g. ICU), if prescribers did not with-
hold (or ‘cease’) the medications on the patient's record, then all 
medications would become automatically ‘overdue’, with the result 
that it was difficult to determine the history of treatment (e.g. id214, 
id227). Recurrent incidents involved duplicated, or multiple, pre-
scriptions of a medication, for example resulting from omitting to 
cease a previous order once a new one was added, the former con-
tinuing to be scheduled automatically on MAR (id188).
Incidents also occurred, which reflected incompatibilities of the 
EMM with existing workflows. As an example, nurses signed that a 
dose had been given, prior to (rather than after) administering the 
medication to the patient. This was problematic if for some reason 
the patient then did not, or could not, take the dose or took it later 
than documented. The dose already signed for on the EMM could 
not be ‘undone’ (id488), countersigned by a second nurse (id298) 
and/or its timing changed (id25), with risks for time compression of 
doses (risk of toxicity) or a dose not being administered.
Another recurrent example related to the activation of the drugs 
for administration—how this was done (or not done) affected sub-
sequent tasks. For example, medications were missing from MAR 
because ‘block of inpatient chemo not being activated as a whole but 
rather day by day’ in the outpatient clinic (id41). Finally, reported in-
cidents described doses ‘falling off’ the medication chart. One of the 
reasons for this was medications prescribed with shorter durations 
than needed (id81, id109).
Few incidents related to EMM data configuration or implementa-
tion, including missing prescribing plans (id135–140, id144).
3.2.4 | Missing EMM safety features (HIT 5)
Three incidents suggested that a contributing factor to the events was 
the absence of EMM features, such as specific decision support (id23), 
the availability of information (conversion rate for an unusual chemo-
therapy unit—id674) and space for recording monitoring activity:
We	used	to	check	syringes	every	hour	and	record	how	
much was left in the syringe, but since EMR [EMM] 
started this practice ceased as there was nowhere to 
record this information. 
(id425)
4  | DISCUSSION
Incident reports offer a valuable bird's eye view of the events those 
working at the front line consider important for the safety of pa-
tients. Our analysis showed that medication safety incidents in pae-
diatric oncology occurred in prescribing, dispensing, administration 
and monitoring tasks, consistent with those found in adult oncology 
and other clinical settings (Ferner & Aronson, 1999, 2006; Fyhr & 
Akselsson,	2012;	Schwappach	&	Wernli,	2010).	However,	they	also	
occurred in other tasks, those related to care coordination, to the 
handling or storing of medications and to children or families han-
dling medications. This was also reflected in the large number of 
incidents	 in	 the	 ‘Other’	 category	 (27%)	 in	our	 classification	of	 the	
reported incidents by medication stage. Incidents related to medica-
tion handling can impact patients and families, as well as staff if ap-
propriate cytotoxic protections are not in place. Incidents occurring 
while medications are managed by patients or families, also highlight 
difficulties typical for paediatric oncology patients given the close 
involvement	of	families	in	patients’	care	(Walsh	et	al.,	2013;	Walsh,	
Ryan, Daraiseh, & Pai, 2016).
Some of the EMM-related incidents reported were not unique 
to oncology. For example, EMM use in other settings has been as-
sociated	with	an	 increase	 in	duplicated	orders	 (Wetterneck	et	al.,	
2011). However, we identified incidents that were specific to on-
cology, in particular in connection with protocol-mandated care. 
In the literature, safety events related to protocols, also known as 
roadmap errors	(Hatton,	2018;	Watts	&	Parsons,	2013),	usually	in-
volve incorrect protocols or sequencing of cycles. In addition to 
these types of incidents, we found the absence of the protocol 
in patients’ EMM records to be an issue. The need to co-ordinate 
order, verification, approval and delivery of varying therapy and 
interdependent doses, timed to coincide with clinical and labora-
tory parameters, as well as the health of the patient, required inser-
tion of steps and check points in the EMM. Incidents surrounding 
these check points (the ‘ready for chemo tick’) are examples of 
medication safety events also found to be associated with approval 
processes and communication in other oncology settings (Hatton, 
2018; Ranchon et al., 2011).
EMM-related incidents also appeared to reflect difficulties with 
technology automated behaviours. ‘Automaticity’ contributed to: 
negative user experiences, ‘incorrect use’ of the system, and con-
cealing software issues. It is likely that specific EMM design features 
contributed to negative user experiences and incorrect use (Ratwani 
et al., 2018). Some users had difficulty understanding EMM function-
ality and at times managed to overcome blocks without being able to 
appreciate the source of the problem, reducing their ability to learn. 
The hospital has incorporated lessons learned from incidents within 
the training of new clinical staff, especially that received by doctors 
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on rotation. During EMM training, clinicians are made aware of EMM 
automatic behaviours and of the downstream consequences of 
their actions for others using the system in the medication process. 
Ongoing pharmacy assistance on site, and a training manual, equips 
users with strategies to prevent or troubleshoot common issues as-
sociated with ‘incorrect’ use of the system. Thus, when technology 
cannot be improved by redesign, problems can be avoided through 
reflective practice and careful use. However, this requires continu-
ous efforts of learning and improvement at the organisational level.
4.1 | Limitations
The incidents we studied are not an accurate representation of all 
incidents in this hospital nor of those that are EMM related. Absence 
of EMM from the reports is not evidence that EMM was not a fac-
tor in the incident. The reports contained often limited information. 
The field Contributing factors	was	empty	in	55%	(456)	of	reports,	and	
some descriptions were truncated. The limited information included 
in	incident	descriptions	also	affected	our	coding.	We	were	only	able	
to	reach	~50%	agreement	for	medication	stage.	We	addressed	this	
limitation by having two reviewers to discuss all incidents until con-
sensus was reached. The scope of this study is limited to what ‘goes 
wrong’ with EMM, as it is unlikely that staff will report on the ben-
efits and value of EMM in an incident report.
5  | CONCLUSION
We	analysed	patient	safety	incident	reports	with	paediatric	oncology	
patients following an implementation of EMM. A large proportion 
of incidents related to medications. They reflected protocol-based 
therapies rich in interdependencies, especially complex in paedi-
atrics, with tasks distributed across clinicians over time. Standard 
classifications of medication incidents do not seem to capture this 
complexity in medication use and workflow. EMM informs and co-
ordinates a patient's treatment, in part through the automation of 
interdependencies—such as the scheduling of doses and tests, work-
flows’ rules and check points. However, this ‘automaticity’ also con-
tributed to incidents in different ways. To ensure medication safety 
with EMM in oncology, it is essential that clinicians are aware of and 
attend to EMM automatic behaviours and are equipped to trouble-
shoot them.
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